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Abstract
In this paper, we argue that social decisionmaking is subject to a
fundamental conflict between consistency and completeness. We show
that a consistent welfarist method of policy assessment, that is, one
that never violates the Pareto principle, may be incomplete in the
sense of being incapable of providing a solution to important social
welfare problems.
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1

Introduction

In this paper we argue that policymaking is subject to a fundamental dilemma,
one between consistency and completeness. By consistency we mean the implementation of a set of criteria for policy assessment that do not contradict
each other. By completeness we refer to the ability of such a set of criteria
to assess all relevant policy issues. Consistency does not imply completeness.
To the contrary, as we will show, these two goals may in fact conflict.
Recent literature has focused on the issue of consistency, mostly leaving the problem of completeness without discussion.1 In particular, Kaplow
and Shavell (2001) show that any non-welfarist method of policy assessment
violates the Pareto principle. The implications of this result are straightforward. If policies are chosen according to criteria that are inconsistent with
the welfarist method, the outcome will not maximize welfare. Consequently,
they call for consistency in social decisionmaking.
In our analysis we take a step further and address the issue of completeness. We analyze a model of non-trivial policy assessment that the
welfarist method is potentially incapable of solving. We argue that the welfarist method may be unable to assess policies that concern the aggregation
of individual preferences in a social welfare function. The reason is that,
when individuals have preferences over a certain social welfare function, the
problem becomes recursive and may admit no solution or an infinite number
of solutions, which is not helpful for policymaking.
Therefore, a consistent welfarist method may be incomplete in the sense
of being incapable of providing a solution to important social welfare problems and effective policy guidance. A consequence of this conflict between
consistency and and completeness is that, in many circumstances, social
1

See, however, Dari-Mattiacci (2004) considering the debate on completeness vs. consistency in mathematics and logic and its implications for welfare economics. See also
McDonnel (2003) on the issue of recursivity that will be be addressed below in the text.
Farnsworth (2002) addresses the issue of changes in preferences, which will be analyzed
later in the text, and notices that the choice of the criterion concerning how preferences
should be shaped involves non-welfarists considerations. We argue instead that, even if
that criterion were entirely welfarists, the recursivity of the the logical reasoning needed
to assess such policies may ultimately yield no solution to the problem.
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decision-making cannot solely rest on the welfarist method.
Thus, if a consistent method is incomplete, a method that guarantees
completeness can only be constructed by implementing a set of criteria that
allows for some internal inconsistency. The consequence is that, to be complete, social decision-making could have to take into account those fairness
values, and more generally non-individualistic determinants, that were rejected at the outset because inconsistent with the Pareto principle.
We should distinguish how our approach relates to Kaplow and Shavell’s
article from others. We do not argue, as some have done, that their analysis is
incorrect.2 In fact, what they maintain cannot be wrong as it ultimately rests
on a tautology.3 Our claim, instead, is that consistency comes at the price of
incompleteness, as there are situations in which a consistent Paretian method
cannot provide a satisfactory answer to the problem of ranking policies.4
Nor do we make any statement about whether a consistent Paretian method
should or should not be regarded as the preferable way to to assess social
policies. We believe that Kaplow and Shavell’s analysis does does not give
an answer to this question5 and nor do we.
2

See Chang (2000a and 2000b) and, for a response, Kaplow and Shavell (2000). See
also Fleurbaey, Tungodden, and Chang (2003) and, for a reply, Kaplow and and Shavell
(2004a). In addition, see Craswell (2003), Kornhauser (2003), and and Waldron (2003)
and, for a response, Kaplow and Shavell (2003). For a more more recent critique, see
Ripstein (2004) and, for a reply, Kaplow and Shavell (2004b). Finally, see Dorff (2002),
Fried (2002).
3
Here we exclusively refer to the argument, and not to the article. The authors themselves qualify the core of this argument as tautological; see Kaplow and Shavell (2002,
p. 7). The authors further argue that notions of fairness may be used as proxies for the
Pareto principle and that notions of fairness may have evolved as rules of thumb for the
implementation of the Pareto principle. These arguments are not contested here.
4
Kornhauser (2003) argues that the aggregation of preferences may be be problematic
when people have preferences over different ’regimes of rights’. This argument is similar
to ours, but tries to disprove consistency rather rather than completeness as we do. For
the same reason, our analysis is different different from Sen (1970).
5
Kaplow and Shavell (2002) argue that basing policy making on criteria that conflict
with the Pareto principle does ultimately reduce social welfare. However, they do not
systematically prove that the maximization of social welfare should be the object of policy
making. See Dorff (2002) and Ferzan (2004) on this point.
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2

Analysis

Let x be a complete description of the world and n the number of individuals, where x = (x1 , ..., xn ) is a comprehensive account of each individual’s
situation. Define X to be the set of all conceivable states of the world.
From Kaplow and Shavell (2001), we can make the following statements:
(1) A social welfare function F is a function from X to the real line <.
(2) An individual utility function for each i = 1, ..., n is also a function from
X to <.
(3) An individualistic social welfare function is a social welfare function of
the form F (U1 (x), ..., Un (x)).
(4) A social welfare function is not individualistic if and only if there exist
x, x0 ∈ X such that Ui (x) = Ui (x0 ) for all i and F (x) 6= F (x0 ).
(5) The weak Pareto principle is that if, for any states x, x0 ∈ X, we have
Ui (x) > Ui (x0 ) for all i = 1, ..., n, then F (x) > F (x0 ).
(6) If a social welfare function ascribes weight to the same factor independently of its effect on individuals’ utilities in a non-individualistic way, then
that social welfare function violates the Pareto principle (proof in Kaplow
and Shavell, 2001).
Suppose now that F is of the form F (U1 (x), ..., Un (x)) but Ui (x, F (.)) for
all i = 1, ..., n. According to Bergstrom (1999), Ui is an interdependent utility
function such that individual i’s preferences depend on his own situation but
also on society welfare.6 Then for any state of the world x it must be true that
F = F (Ui (x, F (.))). We are interested in whether a system of interdependent
preferences determined by private subutility of x and interdependent social
welfare determines a corresponding system of independent utility functions
Vi : X → < and an independent social welfare function G(x). Unfortunately
a general answer to recursive social welfare functions is not easy to find
(Bergstrom, 1999; Bramoullé, 2001 and references cited therein). Multiple
6

The original terminology derives from Pollak (1976).
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and infinite utilities as well as no utilities arise from the recognition that the
others’ utility may depend on one’s own utility through social welfare, and the
feedback loop created by this dependency. In fact, we can say that, in general,
social recursive preferences generate multiple utilities and therefore multiple
social welfare functions, and only under strong assumptions, a unique system
of independent utilities and therefore a unique social welfare function will
exist.
As an illustration, assume that Ui (.) is an interdependent utility with
an additively separable form (a Bergstrom-interdependent utility function):
Ui (x, F (.)) = ui (x) + αi F (.)
where ui (x) is the private subutility of x satisfying the usual assumptions
and αi is a constant.7
Also let us also assume that social welfare is a weighted utilitarian function, such that:
F =

n
X

βj Uj (.) =

j=1

n
X

βj uj (x) + F (.)

j=1

n
X

βj αj

j=1

The independent social welfare can be derived as:
Pn

G(u1 (x), ..., un (x)) =

j=1

1−

βj uj (x)
j=1 βj αj

Pn

The independent utility function of individual i is given by:
Pn

Vi (x) = ui (x) + αi

j=1

βj uj (x)
j=1 βj αj

Pn

1−
Pn
1 − j6=i βj αj
i βj uj (x)
ui (x) + αi j6=P
=
Pn
1 − j=1 βj αj
1 − nj=1 βj αj
Pn

There are three possible solutions to be considered:
7
Preferences can be positively interdependent or negatively interdependent, see Ok and
Kockesen (2000). We do not impose any restriction on the sign of α.
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P

(1) nj=1 βj αj < 1: there is a unique solution to the problem of finding an
independent weighted utilitarian social welfare function. This corresponds
to the usual assumption taken in the altruism literature (Becker, 1974; Bernheim and Stark, 1988; Bergstrom, 1999; Bowles and Garoupa, 2002).
P

(2) nj=1 βj αj > 1: the solution we have derived is unstable. According
to Bramoullé (2001), the reasonable economic interpretation of instability
should be that there is an infinite solution set to the problem of finding an
independent weighted utilitarian social welfare function; a related interpretation is discussed by Postlewaite (1998). Nevertheless it is not the case that
all solutions yield the same level of social welfare. Clearly other social criteria
are required to help a welfarist analysis in this situation since policymaking
requires the implementation of a given chosen policy.8
P

(3) nj=1 βj αj = 1: there is no solution to the problem of finding an independent weighted utilitarian social welfare function. A welfarist analysis in this
situation is useless, and yet policymaking requires that some policy is chosen
and implemented.

3

Conclusions

We have provided a framework where a consistent welfarist method of policy assessment (that is, a method based on an individualistic social welfare
function) is incomplete. The reason for incompleteness is the existence of
recursive interdependent preferences. Aggregated individual preferences determine social preferences which, in turn and in many important contexts,
determine individual preferences. We have argued that, although under certain conditions we can use welfare economics to evaluate policies even if
preferences are interdependent, in general the set of welfarist solutions is not
a singleton, because a solution does not exist or because there might be more
than one solution, thus requiring other decision-making criteria to make a
8

Notice also that the usual literature (Becker, 1974; Bernheim and Stark, 1988) discards
this possibility because the independent utility function is decreasing in consumption.
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policy recommendation.9 Incompleteness is a relevant problem because the
alternative policies to be assessed generally yield different levels of individual
and social welfare.
On the policy level, this situation may arise while trying to address two
fundamental problems for social coexistence. One issue is the aggregation
of individual preferences,10 that is, what weight should be given to each individual in society. This problem may arise in relation to the evaluation of
policies concerning issues of equality, liberty, distribution of resources and
similar problems, which are likely to be of central importance for policymaking. In this case, the weight to give to individual preferences is decided
according to the individual preferences themselves. The attempt to do so may
thus result in a circular reasoning yielding no ultimate conclusion. While it
is evident that different social welfare functions yield to the endorsement of
different policies and hence to different levels of individual and social welfare,
such levels may not be comparable for the criterion of assessment (the social
welfare function) is also the object of such an assessment.
A second order of issues concerns the way in which policies do or should
influence individual preferences.11 Education of youth is a complex endeavor
in modern multicultural societies and its most discussed aspects relate precisely to the type of preferences youth should develop. Re-education of criminals or otherwise outcast individuals poses similar problems. Also in this
case, the desirable set of preferences that a society should exhibit is to be
decided according to individuals’ actual and future preferences, thus yielding
the same type of circularity that we discussed above.
It is evident that the assessment of such policies is an inevitable necessity, as society cannot generally afford to let such fundamental questions
unanswered. Consequently, such problems, in many circumstances, will have
to be resolved by resorting to precisely those criteria that give independent
weight to some value other than individual welfare, because, as we have suggested, individual preferences, even if broadly defined, are recursive. As a
9

Kaplow and Shavell (2002, p. 413-418) suggest instead that, also when preferences
depend on policies, a welfarist solution can be found. We argue that, to the contrary, this
might not always be possible.
10
The choice of G(x) in the formal model.
11
The choice of Vi (x) in the formal model.
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result, the implementation of an inconsistent method of policy assessment
may be the necessary price to pay for completeness.
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